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Abstract
Confidential text corpora exist in many forms, but
do not allow arbitrary sharing. We construct typi-
cal text processing applications using appropriate
privacy preservation techniques (including homo-
morphic encryption, Rademacher operators and
secure computation). We set out the preliminary
materials from Rademacher operators for binary
classifiers, and then construct basic text process-
ing approaches to match those binary classifiers.
1. Motivation
Private text data — with confidential content — is difficult
to “open”. Privacy requirements in text data are difficult to
guarantee due to the inter-dependencies of text, and gram-
mar. Although Natural Language Processing (NLP) nomi-
nally operates on numerically encoded text, NLP exploits
the structure of text and not merely a sequence of integer
codes (Hirschberg & Manning, 2015).
Research work in the space of Information Retrieval (IR) has
acknowledged the need to preserve privacy (Si et al., 2014;
Oard, 2015). Mechanisms to accommodate sharing of text
corpora, have essentially reduced to licensing requirements
that allow full access under limited conditions of (re-)use,
since sharing (raw) text data essentially allows a human
to read (and reproduce) the data (Dankar & Emam, 2013;
Thomson, 2004; Ji et al., 2014; McDonald & Kelly, 2012).
1.1. Machine Learning from Private Text Data
The (typical) components of the text document that might be
subject to privacy concerns (names of persons, places, drug-
names, disease-names) are likely to be the components most
interesting for text processing — and most damaging to
algorithm performance if altered. In this work, we consider
a different approach: we apply encryption techniques to
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text which allow learning without viewing the raw data
— thereby applying machine learning without the need to
share (or read) text data to learn from private text corpora
and classify private text.
This work does not avoid the need for ethical approval and
research permission: encryption and privacy preserving
techniques cannot overcome ethical, legislative, or contrac-
tual requirements on what may (or may not) be done with
data. We are interested in allowing groups to ethically inter-
act with data, where raw data sharing would not be desired
(or possible).
1.1.1. TEXT IN HEALTH IS A SPECIAL CASE
Although open sharing is generally accepted as a good prin-
cipal in health (Verhulst et al., 2014; Dunn et al., 2012;
Estrin & Sim, 2010; Veitch & Barbour, 2010); privacy con-
cerns may overwhelm implied scientific benefit (Thomson,
2004; Vogel, 2011; Sayogo & Pardo, 2012). The need to
address privacy while supporting research-use (as well as
non-research use) of health data has been observed (McKeon
et al., 2013). To support confidentiality, the British Medical
Journal [Table 1 (Hrynaszkiewicz et al., 2010) recommends
not publishing verbatim responses or transcriptions of clini-
cal discussions — which is exactly the sort of data that text
mining systems require (Suominen et al., 2014; 2015). The
work of (Jin, 2007) suggests some approaches for privacy-
preserving health analytics, and reviews several privacy-
preserving techniques, although most are numeric focused.
The risk of compromising privacy by being able to con-
ceal the identifiers remains regardless of recent advances
in automated de-identification algorithms for health text.
Algorithms for automated de-identification of health text
have have been evaluated to reach the F1 correctness per-
centage from 81 to 99 in English, French, Japanese, and
Swedish (Dalianis & Velupillai, 2010; Morita et al., 2013;
Chazard et al., 2013; Grouin & Neveol, 2014; Kayaalp et al.,
2014; Meystre et al., 2014).1 However, approximately 90
1F1 is a performance measure that takes values between 0
and 1 — the larger the value, the better the performance. It is
defined as the harmonic mean of precision and recall, that is,
2×(precision×recall)/(precision+recall) where precision refers
to the proportion of correctly identified words for de-identification
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per cent of the residual identifiers left behind by either these
algorithms or human coders can be concealed by applying
additional computation methods (Carrell et al., 2013).
This capability to conceal the identifiers gets even more
alarming after record linkage of different shared corpora.
For example, in the USA, Washington is one of 33 states
that share or sell anonymized patient records. For US$50,
anyone can purchase a patient-level health corpus that con-
tains all hospitalisations that occurred in this state in 2011,
without patient names or addresses, but with full patient
demographics, diagnoses, procedures, attending physician,
hospital, a summary of charges, and how the bill was paid.
By linking these de-identified health records with public
news papers from the same year from Washington State,
leads 43 per cent of the time to concealing the patient’s
name and sometimes even her/his street address (Sweeney,
2015),
As expected, patients are concerned about the potential of
health data sharing and linkage to result in data misuse
and compromised privacy (Simon et al., 2009). However,
they are also enthusiastic about their capacity to improve
the quality and safety of health care through giving their
informed consent to sharing some or all of their own health
records for purposes of (medical) science in general or some
specific research project (Shaw et al., 2016).
Our approach addresses precisely these problems in find-
ing and “hiding” sensitive text. It allow machine learning
algorithms to use all encrypted data, but not all raw text.
2. Background
We assume all participants are Honest But Curious
(HBC) (Paverd et al., 2014). We limit the need for “trusted”
intermediaries (Dwork & Roth, 2014), and where such inter-
mediaries are used, we restrict (by aggregation and secure
computing) the information they may receive.
2.1. Text Processing
We consider the typical linear so-called “1-best” pipeline
as outlined in (Johnson, 2014). This could be extended to
parallel, iterative, or network approaches. We shall ignore
feature engineering and simply presume a (large) number of
categorical variables. A particular example of text process-
ing pipeline output is outlined in Figure 1 of (Hirschberg &
Manning, 2015).
In training, the text processing pipeline also uses labelled
text segments — which may be document-, sentence- or
word- labels (e.g. for sentiment analysis) or some com-
to all de-identified words and recall refers to the proportion of
correctly identified words for de-identification to all words that
should have been de-identified.
bination of text fragments (such as used by the Browser
Rapid Annotation Tool (BRAT) for collaborative text an-
notation (Stenetorp et al., 2012)). In each case, we may
represent the features as numeric labels — where the “tags”
are converted into a dictionary — and a series of numeric
values. We shall be interested in binary values — such as
might result from a “1-hot” encoding. These become our
observations, and also labels.
A differential-privacy approach is not suitable for this data
type: adding “noise” to the encoded text will either render
the “new” text meaningless, or be overcome — by treat-
ing the noise as spelling or grammatic errors. We use the
approach of (Shannon, 1949) — to improve independent
secret systems by concatenating them. In this case, we
will firstly encrypt the numeric features and labels (using
a Paillier homomorphic encryption system (Paillier, 1999;
Damgård & Jurik, 2001)). This makes direct interpretation
difficult. Second, we attempt to address the data dependen-
cies by applying irreversible aggregation to the numeric data
so as to hide many of the implied dependencies between
observations. Finally, we wrap the learning process in a
secure learning approach, to further reduce the capacity of
an inquisitive user discovering the underlying labels. This
reflects the well known fact that data dependences must be
accounted for in training, validation, and testing of machine
learning methods in order to produce reliable performance
estimates (Suominen et al., 2008; Pahikkala et al., 2012).
2.2. Partial Homomorphic Encryption
The Paillier encyption scheme (Paillier, 1999) (and later
generalisations (Damgård & Jurik, 2001)) is a public-private
key encryption scheme. We alter the notation of (Franz,
2011) (note, this is different to (Djatmiko et al., 2014))
where an integer x is encrypted as 〈〈x〉〉 and the decrypt
operation is 〈〈y〉〉−1. In other words,
x
encrypt7−→ 〈〈x〉〉 decrypt7−→ 〈〈〈〈x〉〉〉〉−1 = x. (1)
The operations 〈〈·〉〉 and 〈〈·〉〉−1 in Definition (1) are public
key encryptions: users can encrypt data (and perform com-
putations) using a common public key, however, only the
user with the corresponding private key can extract the clear
data.
The main operations for Paillier homomorphic encryption
are the operators⊕ and⊗. They are defined for two integers
x1, x2 < n = pq where n is a constant for the particular
encryption and parameters p and q are two large primes as
follows:
〈〈x1〉〉 ⊕ 〈〈x2〉〉 = 〈〈x1 + x2〉〉 (2)
and
α⊗ 〈〈x2〉〉 = 〈〈α · x2〉〉 (3)
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Figure 1. Text processing pipeline with encryption, pre-processing is encapsulated in the dashed arrow.
where α is an un-encrypted real-valued scalar.
Equations (2) and (3) gain us an ability to sum encrypted
values in the encrypted domain (and consequently decrypt
the result) and multiply encrypted values with un-encrypted
scalars. Note that the result (3) does not apply when α is en-
crypted. For more advanced operations (such as multiplying
encrypted values) we use secure computation.
2.3. Secure Computations
We use results from (Franz, 2011; From & Jakobsen, 2006)
to provide several protocols for secure computation among
two parties A and B. Work from (Clifton et al., 2002)
provides mechanism for multiple parties (i.e., more than
two). We shall assume that A operates on encrypted data,
and B has the private key (and can decrypt data). Neither
party should be able to discern the numerical values. These
protocols comprise the following three steps:
1. an obfuscation step by the public key holder A,
2. a transfer step to the private key holder B, who decrypts
and then performs the calculation on clear data2 and
returns an encrypted result to A, and
3. A then removes the original obfuscation.
Other work extends (Franz, 2011) to linear algebra for ho-
momorphic analysis.
We now recall the work of (Nock et al., 2015) and (Patrini
et al., 2016) to present relevant parts the aggregation tech-
niques. This presents learners on specially aggregated data
sets where the data set could be in a single location.
2.3.1. SINGLE (COMPLETE) DATA SET
We will first consider the data set as a single (coherent)
source. That is, all data is held by a single organisation.
Definition 1 ((Numeric) Supervised Learn-
ing Space). Given a set of m > 0 examples
2As the result is obfuscated, B learns nothing from this opera-
tion, even though it is performed on clear data.
S = {(xi, yi), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}}, where xi ∈ X ⊆ R1×d
are observations, X is the domain, and yi ∈ {−1, 1} are
binary labels. We are concerned with a (binary) linear
classifier θ ∈ Θ for fixed Θ ⊆ R1×d. The label of an
observation x is given by
label(x) = sign
(
θTx
)
∈ {−1, 1}.
The irreversible aggregation is based on Rademacher obser-
vations (rados) as defined below:
Definition 2 (Rado). cf.Definition 1 (Nock et al., 2015)
Let Σ = {−1, 1}n. Then given a set of S, and for any σ ∈
Σ with σ = [σ1, . . . , σn]T . The Rademacher observation
piσ with signature σ is
piσ =
1
2
n∑
i=1
(σi + yi)xi. (4)
2.3.2. MULTIPLE DATA SETS
This case is described in Figure 1 (Patrini et al., 2016). We
do not assume that entities are linked: different text corpora
are held by different parties, and no entity resolution is
performed.
Definition 3 (BB-Rado). cf. Definition 1 (Patrini et al.,
2016) Consider z′ ∈ U ⊂ V . Let lift(z′) concatenate
zeros to z = [z′ 0] such that z ∈ V . For any s ∈ J , labels
y ∈ {−1, 1} and α ∈ R, the α-basic block rado for (s, y)
is
piα(s,y)
·
= α · lift(y · s) +
p∑
j=1
lift
(
pij(s,y)
)
. (5)
2.4. Encrypted Rados
The encryption process occurs after securely processing the
text documents at the private location of B. Using her/his
private key, B then encrypts the features, and these are then
aggregated. The aggregation occurs blind to B, and may be
performed by an honest-but-curious intermediary IB. The
rados piσ are generated privately at IB. Once generated,
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the rados can be used by other honest-but-curious external
parties A.
Figure 2 outlines the encryption steps, using secure math-
ematical operations, and denote the two parties as {B, I}
where B is the private key holder and I is an intermediary.
I can “see” encrypted features 〈〈xi〉〉, and encrypted labels
〈〈yi〉〉, and knows the choices of rado vectors (i.e., I knows
values of σi). It would be possible to operate with σi also
encrypted.
We re-write Equation (4) below with the encrypted val-
ues made explicit. Corresponding secure mathematical
operations are also shown. We use the notation
⊕n
i=1
to denote a series of homomorphic addition operations ie.⊕n
i=1 = a1 ⊕ a2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ an. We will use : as an abuse of
notation, to denote “has the meaning of” rather than equality,
as follows:
〈〈piσ〉〉 : 1
2
m∑
i=1
(σi + 〈〈yi〉〉) 〈〈xi〉〉. (6)
The resulting “Equation” (6) shows the formation of the
(encrypted) rado. The additions and (unencrypted scalar)
multiplications must all be translated to the appropriate
homomorphic addition and multiplication operations.
The output is an encoded rado, based on any numerical field,
that we will refer to as 〈〈piσ〉〉. We outline the procedure to
build the rado in Protocol 1: .
Protocol 1 Encrypted Radomacher
Ensure: 〈〈piσ〉〉
at peer
σ
encrypt7−→ 〈〈σ〉〉
〈〈φ〉〉 ← 〈〈σ〉〉 ⊕ 〈〈y〉〉
〈〈φ〉〉 ← 12 ⊗ 〈〈φ〉〉〈〈piσ〉〉 ← S.INNERPROD(〈〈φ〉〉, 〈〈x〉〉)
2.4.1. MULTI-PARTY CASE
The case for multiple parties requires the use of the lift(·)
function. This function appends zeros onto a vector, and thus
(in the encrypted domain) may be represented as appending
an encrypted scalar (zero) to the encrypted vector. As above,
Equation (5) can be re-written in the encrypted domain.
2.5. Learning, Using Encrypted Rados
2.5.1. UNENCRYPTED SINGLE-PARTY CASE
Recall the learner for rados (in the unencrypted case) is
given by (Nock et al., 2015). We will use the equivalent
(exponential) learner for rados as follows:
Lemma 1 (Rado Learning). (cf. Lemma 2 (Nock et al.,
2015) ) For any θ and S, and a set of rados σ ∈ U ⊆ Σ,
minimizing the loss
log [Fexp(S,θ)] = log
[
1
n
∑
σ∈U
exp
(
−θTpiσ
)]
(7)
is equivalent to minimising the standard logistic loss
Flog(S,θ).
The supervised learning (optimisation) is written as
Problem 1 (Minimise Exponential Loss). The optimal clas-
sifier θ∗ is given by solving
θ∗ = min
θ
J(θ) (8)
where
J(θ) = log
[
1
n
∑
σ∈U
exp
(
−θTpiσ
)]
+ θTθ (9)
and θTθ is a regularising term (a.k.a. regulariser).
2.5.2. SECURE SINGLE-PARTY CASE
The exponential in Equation (9) can be computed securely
using the protocol outlined in (Yu et al., 2011). The loga-
rithm can be performed using Algorithm 1 (Djatmiko et al.,
2016). We perform a gradient descent to solve Problem 1.
Recall Problem 1. Note that the gradient of J(θ), with
respect to θj , is
∂
∂θj
J(θ) =
∑
pi −pij exp (−
∑
i θipii)∑
pi exp (−
∑
i θipii)
+ 2θj . (10)
We note that 〈〈pi〉〉 ∈ P .
Using our abuse of notation : we have
〈〈J(θ)〉〉 :
∑
j
−pij exp
(
−
∑
i
θipii
) . (11)
2.5.3. UNENCRYPTED, MULTI-PARTY CASE
The proof of Theorem 3 (Patrini et al., 2016) shows that
the mean square loss can be used, over P — that is, on the
limited sample sets — by using a modified mean loss as
given in Definition 4 as follows:
Definition 4 (BB-Rado loss). cf. Definition 2 .(Patrini et al.,
2016) and Theorem 3 (Patrini et al., 2016) The M -loss for
the classifier θ is
`M (RS,P) ·= −
(
EP
[
θTpiσ
]
− 1
2
VP
[
θTpiσ
])
+
m
4
θTΓθ (12)
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Figure 1: Generic text processing pipeline. The elements of the pipeline are
adapted from [?]. Note the pipeline transforms unstructured text (left) into
structured numeric features (right). Also note that subsequent elements may
receive as their input not only the output of the immediately preceding element
but also the original text and/or other former outputs. For example, part-of-
speech tagging is typically performed for text enriched by segment boundaries
rather than being dependent on the stemming output. However, the rest of the
analysis is not dependent on the element cascading or their parallelisation but
rather based on the key insight of using the numeric features.
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Figure 2: Feature encryption pipeline, showing encryption links and (dashed)
knowledge at B with private key, and intermediary IB.
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Figure 2. Feature encryption pipeline, showing encryption links and (dashed) knowledge at B with private key, and intermediary IB.
where expectation EP and variance VP are computed with
respect to the uniform sampling of σ in P . If the matrix Γ is
positive definite, it can be defined as a weighted diagonal
matrix
Γ =
[
Im 0m
0n In
]
(13)
where 0 <   1 accounts for (lack of) confidence in
certain columns of pi.
“[M]inimizing the Ridge regularized square loss over exam-
ples is equivalent to minimizing a regularized version of the
M-loss, over the complete set of all rados.” (Patrini et al.,
2016)
The optimal classifier θ? is given by the simple closed-form
expression Theorem 6 (Patrini et al., 2016). Namely,
θ? =
(
BBT + dimc(B) · Γ
)−1
B1 (14)
whereB is stacked (column-wise) rados and dimc(B) is the
number of columns of B. The procedure for building the
rados and solving for θ are given in (Patrini et al., 2016).
To solve (14), (Hall et al., 2011 (revised 2013) recommends
an iterative – Shur (Guo & Higham, 2006)) approach. Faster
approaches (with fewer multiplications) are achieved by
higher order algorithms. An outline and review are given
in (Rajagopalan, 1996; Soleymani, 2012). The inverse may
be found using secure multiplication linear algebra.
2.5.4. DE-RISKING THE COORDINATOR
The notation of (Patrini et al., 2016) suggests a central coor-
dinator with access to all vectors,: we avoid this by returning
to Definition 4. Let
b =
∑
pi∈P
pi = EP (piσ) (15)
and then
∂`
∂θ
= −bT + θT
[
Γ +
1
2
∑
pi∈P
(pi − b) (pi − b)T
]
. (16)
The sums in Equations (15) and (16) are over the appropriate
rados. However, these rados may be calculated by their
peers, so the sums may be broken into per-peer summations,
where we consider disjoint sets Pp such that P1∪P2∪. . . =
P .
Definition 5 (BB-rado per peer). ConsiderP peers with p ∈
{1, 2, . . . , P}, where each peer p has distinct rados drawn
from Pp, and the rados are distinct in P1 ∪ P2 ∪ . . . = P .
For each peer p, we have a expectation ep and variance vp
defined as
ep =
∑
Pp
pii (17)
and
vp =
∑
Pp
(pii − b) (pii − b)T . (18)
Each peer p can calculate ep and vp independently.
Although the mean b may be calculated centrally, it is prefer-
able to use secure multi-party addition to achieve the same
result. This reduces the scope for the coordinator to access
(encrypted, aggregated) vectors, and (instead) only access
noisy aggregates of the data.
3. Putting the Bricks together
The algorithm incorporates the secure multi-party summa-
tion work of (Clifton et al., 2002), to prevent the coordinator
from obtaining the rados directly. This adds a third layer of
obfuscation to the data (encryption, aggregation, blind addi-
tion), which means that at the coordinator (who can decrypt
the data) the data remains protected by the aggregation to
rados and the blind addition of the vectors.
In Figure 3 we have outlined the encrypted pipeline, that
combines Figure 1 with the inverse proposed in (Patrini
et al., 2016), using Protocol 2: .
At each peer p, we now wish to classify a particular obser-
vation vector x. Nominally, we would calculate
yˆ = sign
(
θTx
)
. (19)
However, each peer only has a subset of features x[:]. We
note that the label is determined only by the sign of a scalar,
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Figure 3. Communication architecture for multiple peers, common coordinator. The coordinator sends a common dictionary and public
key to all peers. Each peer has different data components, with some common elements (cyan).Each peer has encrypted and aggregated its
local data (blue server icons). The blue servers correspond to the “intermediary” in Figure 2. The encryption key is generated by the
coordinator. Dashed arrows denote information transfers between participants, whilst solid arrows denote local transformations (at the
respective participant).
and hence, we can break the inner product θTx into an inner
product of local features and remote features as follows:
yˆp = sign
(
θTlocalxlocal + θ
T
remotexremote
)
(20)
= sign
θpTxp︸ ︷︷ ︸
local
+
∑
q 6=p
θq
Txq︸ ︷︷ ︸
remote
 . (21)
The local component of Equation (21) may be calculated at
peer p. If we denote the local classifier result as αp, then
we may write
αp = θp
Txp and (22)
yˆ = sign
(∑
p
αp
)
(23)
= sign
αp +∑
q 6=p
αq
 (24)
The summation in Equation (25) is the sum of all (local)
calculated classifier results on the sub-components of the
vector x. The result of Equation (25) shows that the remote
classification results may be treated as offsets for the local
result — that is, the remote inner products act as corrections
to the local result. However, this requires that every peer
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Protocol 2 Classifier for Secure Text with Central Coordi-
nator
Require: peers p ∈ {1, . . . , P}, coordinator C
Ensure: encrypted classifier 〈〈θ〉〉 at C
Ensure: encrypted local classifier 〈〈θp〉〉 at peer p
Ensure: binary feature vector fp at C { the features avail-
able at each peer p}
at coordinator C:
generate Paillier public key K & secret key S as a pair
send public key K to all peers p ∈ {1, . . . , P}
at each peer p independently:
{run local text labelling on document set}
{Dp document set; D dictionary; {Xp,yp} data and la-
bels }
{Xp,yp} ← LOCALTEXT(D, Dp)
fp ← binary vector of observations
send fp to C
encrypt data and labels {Xp,yp} encrypt7−→ {〈〈Xp〉〉, 〈〈yp〉〉}
build rado’s from encrypted data 〈〈pii〉〉 using public key
K〈〈
pi(p)
〉〉←⊕i 〈〈pii〉〉K {elementwise homomorphic ad-
dition}
at coordinator C:
〈〈b〉〉 ← SM.ADD({1, . . . , P},{〈〈pi(p)〉〉}) {SEC.ADD
using
〈〈
pi(p)
〉〉
}
send mean value 〈〈b〉〉 to all peers p = {1, . . . , P}
at each peer p independently:
〈〈ui〉〉 ← 〈〈pii〉〉 ⊕ (−1)⊗ 〈〈b〉〉
〈〈Bi〉〉 ← S.OUTERPROD(p, C, 〈〈ui〉〉, 〈〈ui〉〉T )
{SEC.OUTERPRODUCT}〈〈
B(p)
〉〉 ← ⊕iBi {elementwise homomorphic addi-
tion}
at coordinator C:
〈〈A〉〉 ← SM.ADD({1, . . . , P},{〈〈B(p)〉〉}) {SEC.ADD
using
〈〈
B(p)
〉〉
}
〈〈V 〉〉 ← S.INV(〈〈A〉〉 ⊕ 〈〈Γ〉〉) {SEC.INVERSION}
〈〈θ〉〉 ← S.MATPROD(〈〈V 〉〉,〈〈b〉〉) {SEC.MULT}
for p = 1 to P do
〈〈θp〉〉 ← 〈〈θ [fp ≡ true]〉〉{local classifier for peer}
send 〈〈θp〉〉 to peer p
end for
share linking information about the observation x. To avoid
this, we replace the summation in Equation (25) with an
equivalent rado as follows:
yˆ = sign
(
αp + θ¬pTpi
)
. (25)
In the homomorphic encrypted case, the local inner prod-
uct can be calculated by keeping the encrypted classifier
vector 〈〈θ〉〉 in its encrypted form, and treating the elements
of x as unencrypted scalars. Finally, the summation may
be achieved using multi-party secure addition, as outlined
in (Clifton et al., 2002).
Protocol 3 Local Classify for Secure Text
Require: coordinator C with public-secret key pair
KC ,SC
Require: common extra rado 〈〈pi〉〉 at C
Require: binary feature vector fp at C { the features avail-
able at each peer p}
Require: encrypted local classifier 〈〈θp〉〉 at each peer p ∈
{1, . . . , P}
Ensure: yˆ label from classification
at peer p:
〈〈αp〉〉 ← S.LOCAL.INNERPROD(p,x, 〈〈θp〉〉)
{LOCAL.SCALARPRODUCT}
at each other peer q 6= p: {The set of peers may be
chosen by C}
〈〈αq〉〉 ← S.INNERPROD(q, C, 〈〈pi〉〉, 〈〈θq〉〉)
{SEC.INNERPRODUCT}
at peer p:
〈〈α〉〉 ← SM.ADD(p = {1, . . . , P}, {〈〈αp〉〉}) {?? using
scalar 〈〈αp〉〉}
send 〈〈α〉〉 to C
at C:
〈〈α〉〉 decrypt7−→ α
send s = sign(α) to peer p
at p:
yˆ ← s
3.1. Usage Scenario for Multi-party, Private Text
In this scenario we outline the key procedure for learning
from distributed private text corpora, and then classifying
a locally private corpora. We shall use names to illuminate
actors. Alice and Bob each have private text collections.
Alice would like to classify her text by using a combination
of patterns learnt from her own data and from Bob’s. Cate3
provides coordination for Alice and Bob. Together, Alice,
Bob and Cate follow Protocol 2 to establish a learned feature
3Cate plays no role in the learning, but is needed as a coordina-
tor.
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Table 1. Results using numerical regression, and trivial text analytics. Encryption does not impact the accuracy of the results, but does
dramatically reduce computation speed.
Grad descent algorithm peers rados θ misclassification run time (s)
LogisticRegression (baseline) 1 plain plain 0.049 0.13s
radoBoost 1 plain plain 0.12 1.4
radoLearn using rados from radoBoost 1 plain plain 0.20 0.069
radoLearn 4 plain plain 0.089 0.12
radoLearn 4 encrypted plain 0.10 75
radoLearn 4 encrypted encrypted 0.085 87
set. As Alice and Bob may have different feature sets, Cate
separates Alice’s appropriate feature vector, and sets the
remaining features to zero. Cate then coordinates Alice and
Bob through Protocol 3.
4. Preliminary results
Using a simple data set from UCI Ionosphere data set – to
provide a significant number of numeric features, agnostic
of text input – we compare basic analytics using various pri-
vacy constraints. For comparison, (Zhou & Jiang, 2004) has
reported a misclassification rate of 0.109, 0.112 & 0.096 us-
ing various neural network approaches. In our case, we have
trialled standard linear regression, against multiple peers
with rados, and θ all calculated in the encrypted domain.
The results are shown in Table 1
Protocol 4 Secure Rado Solver
〈〈T 〉〉 ← S.MATPROD(
{
〈〈B〉〉, 〈〈B〉〉T
}
) {SEC.MULT}
〈〈T 〉〉 ← 〈〈T 〉〉 ⊕ [dimc(B)⊗ 〈〈Γ〉〉]
〈〈V 〉〉 ← S.INV({〈〈T 〉〉}) {SEC.INVERSION }
〈〈V 〉〉 ← S.MATPROD({〈〈V 〉〉, 〈〈B〉〉})
return First row of 〈〈V 〉〉
5. Conclusion
We have outlined a protocol to provide secure text analytics,
by combining standard features with numeric computation
and secure linear algebra with obfuscated addition. Our
result may also be used for numeric, un-trusted coordinators.
Whilst not guaranteeing security, the protocol addresses
common issues with sharing text data – namely visibility of
identifiable information.
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